Gordon Clark is surely right when he declares that 'people are often unable to conceptualize immediate circumstances against market forces that operate beyond the boundaries of current experience and at levels or scales that appear abstract rather than material to the interests of those involved'. In this commentary, I claim that the description of the interactions between behavioral predispositions and the market environment offered by Clark can be of appreciable value in revealing the functioning of market-based environmental governance programs, especially emissions trading schemes. There are tangible similarities between financial markets and carbon markets regarding the need for the regulation of risk-taking behaviors and the governance of market structures. Carbon markets are characterized by long-term time horizons due to the significance of sunk costs and a high degree of uncertainty around the political and financial stability of these markets. Moreover, a number of the same institutions involved in the global financial crisis have taken an interest and developed roles in the financial aspects of carbon trading. The behavior of these institutions and their market traders in the events that preceded the global financial crisis are therefore of immediate relevance to their behaviors in markets for tradable emissions units.
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The unfolding of the global financial crisis and fears over its potential severity displaced climate change from the center of the political agenda and public attention. However, if the global financial crisis has tarnished the expectation for financial markets to deliver efficient and self-correcting outcomes, it has had little effect on enthusiasm for markets in other domains. Despite the failure of the Copenhagen Summit to establish a framework for climate change mitigation post-2012, emissions trading and the development of national and regional carbon markets (and eventually a unified global carbon market) remain the dominant policy response for the abatement of greenhouse gases. In the words of European Commissioner for the Environment Stavros Dimas, 'Climate change is the gravest challenge facing mankind and emissions trading is the most effective policy instrument for tackling it' (Europa, 2006) . Just as regulatory failure and the particular ecology of financial markets were each contributing factors in the global financial crisis, the combustive reaction of myopia with the inherent dynamics of markets as institutions may pose a fundamental obstacle to the (imagined) potential of carbon markets.
As was the case with the origins and repercussions of the global financial crisis, carbon markets have an uneven geography. This geography of markets is a network of spaces, processes, and practices that are coordinated by overlapping institutions and drawn together by the pursuit of exchange. The structure of existing carbon markets includes the territory and politics of states with domestic emissions trading schemes, the scale and type of emissions covered within trading schemes, the exchanges and trading centers where emissions units are coordinated, and sites in the developing world where emissions reduction projects occur.
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Though geographers have critically examined a range of cases where markets are employed for environmental policy instruments (Bailey, 2007; Mansfield, 2006; Robertson, 2004) , there has been relatively less attention to abstract consideration of the market mechanism in environmental governance. Markets as environmental policy instruments differ in important ways from other markets, including financial markets, in that they are explicitly designed, constructed, and deployed (in most cases) by the state. When considering the implications of myopia when markets are used as environmental policy instruments, the issue therefore is not whether regulators are 'asleep at the wheel', but whether regulators are capable of building and steering a roadworthy vehicle.
With the establishment of emissions trading as the dominant policy instrument for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the circulation of three values justifies and promotes this use of the market mechanism. The most common justification for emissions trading is that, by acknowledging the heterogeneity of contexts in which emissions are produced and the superior knowledge of these contexts by the firms that operate within them, emissions trading provides a more efficient means to the achievement of environmental goals than uniform regulatory measures (Tietenberg, 1996) . The second of these values, flexibility -the ability of market actors and regulators to respond to and craft their behaviors in response to market dynamics and the behaviors of other actors -was instrumental in the USA's advocacy of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's inclusion of emissions trading (Grubb, 1999) . Finally, aspects of commodification are critical to the development of emissions trading programs: the establishment of fungibility among different greenhouse gases and the universalization of standards of measurement and verification of emissions flows (Liverman, 2009) .
Paradoxically, the design and implementation of emissions trading schemes requires extensive knowledge of both the sphere of economic activity being regulated and consideration of the expected and the desired behaviors of scheme participants. Alongside a vast number of technical decisions -some of the most basic of which include the point in a product chain that must participate in the scheme, the method and amount of emissions permit allocations, and the degree to which a scheme's design will align or link to other schemes -regulators also develop iterative hypotheses on the potential for participants to undertake market-making and market-breaking behaviors. Each of these potential design features has significant consequences for the function of the carbon market and the behavior of market participants. While the justification and promotion of carbon markets often proceed with reference to these qualities, translating the 'textbook' of emissions trading into a functional program inevitably challenges these supposedly universal characteristics of markets.
When markets are used as a tool for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, and for environmental governance more generally, the interaction of myopia and market structure poses several risks for losses and failures. While the scale of potential profit in financial markets and the peculiar culture of financial traders and investment banks amplified myopic risk calculations and provided insufficient consideration to the potential of significant losses, some form of myopia is likely to be a feature in all varieties of market behavior. Just as geographers should avoid following neoclassical economists in assuming rationality to be universal and undifferentiated, neither should we assume that deviations from rationality necessarily follow a set form. Markets (and all economic institutions) are embedded within -and produced by -particular social and regulatory structures (Hess, 2004) . Only by exploring the different rules and roles of particular markets and market participants can these context-specific forms of rationality be revealed. For example, in phase one of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (2005) (2006) (2007) , many companies may have missed opportunities for profit from the sale of their excess emissions permits early in the scheme due to unfamiliarity with the market dynamics of the new scheme (MacKenzie, 2009) . Such market behaviors demonstrate a myopia of a different kind, but one that nonetheless undermines the assumed degree of efficiency of the marketbased instrument. The negative consequences arising from this inefficiency, however, were born internally by these companies rather than society.
An assumption shared between the regulators who expected financial markets to be selfregulating, and economists theorizing the efficiency of carbon markets, is that knowledge of market dynamics is uniform across all actors. As Clark noted in the case of financial markets, participants' perception of their position within the market's ecology will affect the type of activities they undertake. Contrary to equilibrium models that assume an equivalence of rationality, position, and behavior among actors, this reflexive positioning, whether accurate or not, can play a significant role in market dynamics. Market position and market intelligence are also immensely important in the decisionmaking of participants in emissions trading, especially when there is a dearth of historical information on market dynamics. Even in the narrowest of markets this intelligence is unevenly distributed, and its distribution becomes increasingly uneven and potentially more disruptive as carbon markets include smaller operations in the pursuit of comprehensive coverage of emissions sources and sinks. Despite these structural similarities, there are critical differences in the implications of regulatory responses to myopia within financial markets and markets for emissions permits. Clark claims that 'it seems quite unlikely that myopic behaviour can be driven out of financial markets'. His description of market actors as predisposed to myopia offers an understanding of myopia's role in the global financial crisis, but little suggestion of how market structures might be redesigned to minimize the prevalence or the destructive capability of myopia. While the recognition of the interaction between myopia and a particular market ecology is an important advance in developing an empirically informed account of markets, the potential for reshaping market governance and bringing about intentional changes in the ecology of financial markets eludes this account. If the failure of markets really does have its roots in the human psyche, then it may be remarkably hard to change, despite attention to how myopia is melded by institutional conditions.
In the case of emissions trading schemes, the presence of the market mechanism and the human tendency for myopia will mean that carbon markets are inevitably less efficient than their theoretical foundations assume and that they may be subject to the same shocks and crises as financial markets. This does not imply, however, that there are not better and worse designs of emissions trading schemes. Rather, it implies that as carbon markets fail to deliver efficient and equitable outcomes their market ecologies should be continuously recalibrated and made subject to the demands of moral concern. In addition, policy-makers should be wary of assuming that the market mechanism is, in isolation from other policy programs, sufficient to achieve desirable outcomes in greenhouse gas mitigation, or in other policy realms. While markets have retained much of their support among the public and among technocrats, it is important to avoid focusing on the selection of the policy instrument at the expense of attention to policy aims.
While markets, as a socially embedded economic mechanism, are worthy of specific attention from geographers, we should be careful to avoid reifying markets as somehow outside of culture, society, and politics. Markets, in both their actual presence and their imagined qualities, have become a central feature of social and environmental regulation. We should avoid treating the hegemony of market mechanisms and market cultures as inevitable, though, and instead explore other instruments of governance which can complement the positive aims of market institutions and moderate or ameliorate their negative consequences. What is needed within empirically informed accounts of markets, then, is further exploration of the processes by which market governance, market ecologies, and market behaviors interact, and persistent attention to the technical details of market design and the institutional context within which markets operate. Given the proliferation of markets and the permeation of a drive for market-rationality into many facets of everyday life, there is significant ground for further exploration of the relationships between market behaviors and market structures. 
